Estimates from the Boston condominium market show that owners with high loanto-value ratios take longer to sell their properties than owners with low loan-to-value ratios. When sold, properties with high loan-to-value ratios receive a higher price than units with less debt. Both of these results are consistent with a search model in which owners "constrained" by large amounts of debt set a higher reservation price than "unconstrained" owners, accepting a lower probability of sale in exchange for a higher final sales price, and thus lend credibility to theoretical models that establish a link between sales volume and prices through changes in the equity of existing homeowners.
Introduction
One of the distinctive and puzzling features of the housing market cycle is the dramatic variation in sales volume over time.
In Massachusetts, for example, total sales of existing homes increased from 42,500 in 1982 to over 100,000 in 1987, and then fell below 60,000 by 1992 (National Association of Realtors 1993).
Over that same time period, real prices rose by over 130 percent, and then declined by almost one-third. These changes are much more dramatic than the movements of economic fundamentals such as unemployment and gross state product over the same time period.
Some have argued that this positive price-volume correlation in real estate is due to sellers who do not accept market conditions when prices fall, refusing to sell their house for a nominal loss or below some other value that is above the current market price. Finally, the uniqueness of individual properties may prevent sellers from recognizing market-wide price changes, and thus sellers may be Case and Shi Her (1988) conducted a survey of recent home buyers and found that 57 percent of the Boston respondents agreed with the following proposition: "Since housing prices are unlikely to drop very much, the best strategy in a slow market is to hold on until you get what you want for a property." Almost 20 percent of the respondents who had previously sold a home noted that they set their reservation price based on what they previously paid.
2 See Case and Shiller (1989) and Meese and Wallace (1993) for evidence of forecastable long-run returns.
slow to adjust their reservation prices in a changing market, at least in the short term.
Recently Stein (1993) has proposed an alternative explanation, arguing that down payments and other borrowing constraints can add a self-reinforcing mechanism to demand shocks. When housing prices fall, equity losses on current homes may prevent potential buyers who rely on the proceeds from the sale of their existing home for a down payment on the next from purchasing a home of equal value. Instead, they will either buy a smaller home or forgo moving altogether. The first course leads to a decrease in demand and hence an even lower price; the second, to a diminution of sales of existing homes.
Together, they explain the positive correlation between volume and price.
Also, in this way, initial contractions in demand are magnified. Note that the mechanism works through the asymmetric treatment of housing purchasers, who are required to contribute some equity, and incumbent owners, whose equity position may deteriorate without their being forced out of the dwelling. Mayer (1993) shows that high-priced homes seem to increase faster in upturns and decrease faster in downturns than low-priced homes. Smith and Tesarek (1991) The equity hypothesis is to be reinterpreted, then, as the claim that owners with insufficient equity in their house will choose a higher reservation price. Consequently, the hazard rate of sale (the probability that a property will sell in period t given that it has survived on the market t-1 periods) will be smaller. Furthermore, transaction prices will be higher.
To the extent that asking prices reflect reservation prices, they, too will be higher.
The argument is most simply stated in a world in which all houses are equally valued by the market. Then the level of the down payment constraint together with the extent of equity in the existing home will put a floor on the set of offers that the seller could accept and still move to a comparable house.
If that floor exceeds what would otherwise be the reservation price, it will serve as the reservation price.
An inherent nonlinearity exists in the relationship between equity and reservation price. Those owners whose equity stake in their present home is sufficiently high that they are unconstrained will be insensitive to small changes in their equity shares.
But for those who are constrained-but not so encumbered by debt that moving is out of the question-every dollar more of equity is a dollar more that can be applied to the new home. We examine that nonlinearity in our empirical work.
Our sample is restricted to the population of units that are listed for sale.
Thus we condition on the owner exhibiting some interest in selling the property. Although this might introduce a selection bias, its direction is clear:
If low equity deters listing as well, among "constrained" owners only the most eager to sell will list, and the equity effect on the sale hazard and price will be more difficult to detect. When a property exited from LINK, its destination was labeled either "sale" or "off-market," according to whether a sale transaction record was found in Banker & Tradesman in a window of two months prior to four months after the date of exit. Because of matching difficulties, some sales will be misclassified as "off-market." Also, any initial agreements that led to a unit exiting from LINK but later fell through will be classified as "off-
In Boston, owners can obtain a tax exemption equal to 10 percent of the city's average property tax bill by certifying that the owner lived in his/her unit on January 1st of a given tax year. 5 A listing that failed to match had an address that was too vague for exact matching or was different from the property's legal address. The initial matching by computer was followed by a round of matching by hand. 
Hazard Rate of Sale
This section estimates the contribution of equity to the hazard rate of sale-the probability that a property sells in any given week, given that an We estimate the parameters by Cox's partial likelihood method. Units that remain listed but unsold at the end of our sample period, December 1992, are considered to be right censored. Units that are delisted without sale (go "off-mar kef) are considered to be censored at their time of exit. Although some properties go "off market" because of exogeneous changes in the conditions of the household, others exit when the owners become discouraged.
Under the null hypothesis of no equity effect on selling, the treatment of "off market" properties should have no effect on the estimated coefficients.
Under the alternative that equity does matter, the likely bias is positive if, precisely because they are less likely to sell, high loan-to-value properties are more likely to go off market. The presence of this bias will make the Stein model more difficult to establish. Table 2 presents estimates of the proportional hazards model. The evidence strongly favors the conclusion that higher loan-to-value ratios decrease the sale hazard.
As column (1) indicates, the coefficient on the loan-to-value ratio is negative and highly significant, and suggests that a property with an outstanding mortgage balance equal to its assessed value would be about 75
percent (e"" 29 ) as likely to sell in a given week as an identical property with no mortgage. That conclusion continues to hold when a dummy variable for the absence of any mortgage is included, as in column (2). Columns (4) and (5) show that including property attributes and the inverse of the property's assessed value ((Value)* 1 ) has little effect on the coefficient on loan-tovalue coefficient.
All specifications include year-of-entry dummies. Because prices and assessed values declined substantially over the period, loan-to-value ratios are much higher in 1991 and 1992 than in 1990. The dummies are included to avoid confusing any aggregate time effects with the equity effect. We suspect that the much lower estimated hazard in 1990 than in the following years is due to the more rapid decline in prices in that year, and to the fact that owners are slow to adjust their reservation prices in the face of price shocks.
Future work will examine this conjecture.
Years since last sale (at time of entry) is included in all columns since, by construction of the mortgage balance, it, too, is highly correlated with the loan-to-value ratio and, because of the dependence of mobility on Given the inherent nonlinearity in the hypothesized relationship between equity and time to sale, columns (3) and (6) introduce a spline function, so that the log-hazard is piecewise linear and continuous in the loan-to-value.
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This allows the sensitivity of the hazard to loan-to-value to differ on either side of 0.8, which corresponds to a 20 percent cash outlay for the down payment and closing costs, 8 and so is consistent with the theoretical prediction that only high loan-to-value units-those of "constrained"
households -are sensitive to equity. Consistent with theory, the hazard rate is more sensitive to loan to value above than below the knot; however, the difference is not significant. Table 3 repeats Table 2 with the indexed previous sale price replacing the official assessed value. The coefficients are remarkably similar to those in Table 2 , although they are slightly larger. For example, increasing the loan-to-value ratio from to 1 decreases the sale hazard by 31 percent using the Table 3 estimates (column (1)) rather than the 25 percent of Table 2 .
The additional variable is defined as the product of loan-to-value and a dummy variable that equals 1 when loan-to-value is above the cutoff and otherwise. Table 4 compares the hazard rates for owner-occupants and investors.
When the two groups are forced to share the same baseline hazard, whether with property attributes (column (2)) or without (column (1)), it is impossible to reject the null that the loan-to-value coefficients are the same. When the baseline hazards are allowed to differ, the magnitude of the coefficient for investors (column (4)) exceeds that for owner-occupants (column (3)), though not significantly so.
From the narrow perspective of the equity hypothesis, this result is surprising.
The hypothesis is a story about trading homes; there is no obvious reason why it should also apply to investors. We offer a simple explanation of why investors are also sensitive to equity.
When the value of a property falls below the difference between the remaining loan balance and any other assets, the owner will default on the loan if the unit is sold. Thus, so long as rent is sufficient to cover the scheduled mortgage payments, the owner is better off continuing to hold the property and waiting for it to appreciate.
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In essence, he holds a put option.
The value of the option is positive if prices follow a random walk (as in an asset model), and greater still if there long-run returns to holding real estate in a down market are positive, as suggested by Case and Shiller (1989) and Meese and Wallace (1993) . For this reason, we expect investors who own units with high loan to values, like owner-occupants, to set high
If the rent falls below the mortgage payments, holding the property remains the optimal policy so long as the option value exceeds the cash outflow. Prices Table 5 presents the regression of the (log) transaction price on the loan-to-value ratio. Property attributes, the (log) assessed value, and dummies for the quarter of sale are also included. The coefficient on the assessed value exceeds 0.9 in the first four columns, even after separately controlling for the hedonic attributes, providing evidence that the assessed value is a very good proxy for the current value. Table 5 gives further evidence in favor of the search version of the equity hypothesis. At 0.14, the coefficient on loan-to-value in column (1) is
Although the argument applies to owner-occupants as well, because investors can more easily shield their assets (through incorporation or the "homestead" exemption) and face a lower cost of default, they are more likely to exercise this option.
For this reason, banks generally require greater initial equity from investors. Column (4) shows that the loan-to-value ratio has somewhat lesser effect on the asking price than on the transaction price. The estimates indicate that owners with a loan-to-value ratio of 1 set an asking price that is, on average, about 10 percent higher than the asking price set by owners who have no mortgage. Column (5) shows that the discount (the excess of the (log) asking price over the (log) sale price) is decreasing in loan-to-value.
VII.
Conclusion
This paper shows that units with low equity take longer to sell and obtain a higher price when sold. These results lend credibility to the theory that initial decreases in property prices may lead to further declines in demand by reducing home equity. Each week that it is on the market, a unit with an outstanding mortgage balance equal to its market value is one-third less likely to sell than a unit with no mortgage at all. Consistent with a strategy of holding out for a high price, the first unit will obtain a price that is 10 percent higher than the second, if both sell.
Can the equity hypothesis alone explain the aggregate behavior of the market? Given that condominium prices in Boston decreased by almost one-third between 1990 and 1992 (and thus loan-to-value ratios increased by nearly 50 percent), our estimates would predict a decline in the hazard rate of about 15 11 A grid search over the knot yielded a value of 0.67.
percent.
To the extent that low equity units are less likely to be listed in the first place, we would expect a decrease in sales as well.
In fact, the opposite is true: both the hazard rate and sales increased over those years! Table 2 shows that properties entering the market at the end of the sample period sold twice as quickly as units entering in 1990. The price Index was calculated using an arithmetic resale price asdroflor and corresponds to the first quarter of each yeat i ne pnce oata rauoe matcneo sans n me link coverage area, oernrai Boston, ooutn Boston, ana unanesiown.
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